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On or about 3rd May 2009, Baby A (1st Petitioner) was born as an intersex child.2 On 10th May 
2009, Kenyatta National Hospital (2nd Respondent) conducted various medical tests on the 1st 
Petitioner and on one of the documents that captured the 1st Petitioner’s details, inserted a 
question mark ‘?’ in the column that indicated the child’s sex. The Petitioners claimed that the 
entry of a question mark to indicate the sex of Baby A violated the rights of the child to legal 
recognition, dignity and freedom from inhuman and degrading treatment. These rights were 
guaranteed in Section 4 of the Children Act3 and Articles 27, 28 and 29 of the Constitution of 
Kenya.4  
The petitioners pointed out that the Registration of Births and Deaths Act5 only provided for 
the registration of male and female persons. Additionally, Baby A had not been issued a birth 
certificate by the time the petition had gone to Court on 24th May 2013. Consequently, the 
petitioners claimed that Baby A was denied the right to legal recognition which violates Article 
7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that the child has a right to be 
registered immediately after birth. The petitioners also argued inter alia, that the Respondents 
failed to discharge their positive obligation and duty owed to Baby A under Article 20 of the 
Constitution which provides that the Bill of Rights shall be enjoyed by every person to the 
greatest extent consistent with the nature of the right or fundamental freedom.  
Consequently, the Petitioners sought a declaration that intersex children are entitled to and or 
guaranteed the same rights as all other persons within the Kenyan jurisdiction pursuant to the 
Constitution, the Children Act and various international instruments to which Kenya is a 
signatory such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights. The Petitioners also sought a declaration that all surgery on intersex infants 
that is merely cosmetic and not therapeutic be approved by a Court by way of judicial review 
order under Article 23 of the Constitution under the principles of parens partriae and the best 
interest of the intersex child. Lastly, the Petitioners sought an order directing the 1st Respondent 
to investigate, monitor and collect statistics on all intersex children in Kenya. 
Holding  
The High Court Held that the Respondents did not violate any of the 1st Petitioner’s rights due 
to the apparent lack of tangible evidence. It was indisputable that the 1st Petitioner was in fact 
an intersex child and the Court relied upon the lab report that had a question mark inserted to 
denote Baby A’s sex as a show that the medical practitioners on hand could not categorise the 
1st Petitioner as either male or female. Therefore, the only logical conclusion was that Baby A 
was an intersex child.6 The point of contention was whether or not the 1st Petitioner had 
                                                          
1 LLB (University of Zambia). 
2 This means that Baby A was born with both male and female genitalia. 
3 Children Act, 2001 [Kenya], No. 8 of 2001, 31 December 2001. 
4 Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
5 Chapter 149 Laws of Kenya. 
6 Baby ‘A’ (Suing through the Mother E A) & another v Attorney General & 6 others [2014] eKLR. para 52. 




suffered a lack of legal recognition due to this intersex status vis-à-vis the lack of a third 
category of sex capturing intersex persons within the Kenyan legal framework.  
The Court stated that it could not find that the Respondents infringed the rights of the 1st 
Petitioner as the Petitioners apparently failed to bring any evidence in that regard and went on 
further to state that discrimination is not an academic matter and it should be based on real facts 
and tangible evidence.7 Furthermore, despite the Court’s acknowledgment that the 1st Petitioner 
and all other intersex persons were entitled to all rights under the Bill of Rights, the Court stated 
that to create a third category of sex would be overstretching the mandate of the Court. In what 
appeared to be a bid to honour the doctrine of Separation of Powers, the Court stated that adding 
a third category of sex to capture intersex persons was a matter that ought to be addressed by 
the legislature and not the Court.  
Significance 
A careful analysis of the provisions of the Constitution of Kenya pertaining to the Bill of Rights 
and the corresponding duties of the Court lead to the conclusion that the Court failed to dispose 
of its duties to protect the 1st Petitioner’s fundamental rights. Article 22(1) of the Constitution 
provides that, ‘Every person has the right to institute court proceedings claiming that a 
fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights has been denied, violated or infringed or is 
threatened.’8 The inclusion of the word ‘threatened’ in Article 22(1) can reasonably be 
interpreted to mean that no actual suffering has to have occurred for a person to institute 
proceedings for the enforcement of their fundamental freedoms. It is enough cause that a 
situation exists that could potentially lead to the infringement of the person’s rights for them to 
institute proceedings. Furthermore, Articles 259(1)(b) and (c) when read in tandem, provide 
that the Constitution ought to be interpreted in a manner that advances human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as laid out in the Bill of Rights and in a manner that permits the 
development of the law.  
It can be argued that it was open for the Court in this case to analyse the circumstances of the 
case and weigh them up against the backdrop of the legal landscape in the country and come 
to the conclusion that it was in the best interest for the advancement of human rights and the 
development of the law to hold that the Respondents had indeed violated the 1st Petitioner’s 
rights. The importance of this case not only for the 1st Petitioner, but for all other intersex 
persons in the Country was not lost on the Court as it stated that, ‘The issues raised in the 
present Petition must be looked at in the wider context of the place of intersexuals in our society 
as opposed to the narrower and specific interests of Baby A who is only one such person in our 
Society.’9 Therefore, it was open for the Court to decide that the lack of a category of sex that 
accounted for intersex persons was an infringement of intersex persons’ freedom from 
discrimination as guaranteed in the Constitution and right to legal recognition as guaranteed in 
the international instruments that Kenya had ratified and form part of Kenya’s legal system by 
virtue of Article 2(5) of the Constitution, thus securing intersex rights.  
Alternatively, the Court could have decided that the continued lack of legal recognition for 
intersex persons, if not a violation in itself, could lead to the violation of the individual’s rights 
to self-determination and is a hindrance to the autonomy of the intersex person which are both 
protected in international human rights law and attain the force of law by virtue of the Kenyan 
Constitution recognition of international human rights law as enforceable.  
                                                          
7 Ibid para 62. 
8 Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
9 Baby ‘A’ (Suing through the Mother E A) & another v Attorney General & 6 others [2014] eKLR para 61. 




Both of these approaches would have resulted in the laying down of a sound judgment which 
was going to promote the development of the law regarding intersex human rights. Had the 
Court found that the Respondents had infringed the 1st Petitioner’s rights, the Respondents 
would have been forced to honour their mandate as prescribed in Article 21(1) of the 
Constitution that provides that, ‘It is a fundamental duty of the State and every State organ to 
observe, respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of 
Rights.’ Additionally, Article 21(4) of the Constitution compels the State to enact and 
implement legislation that fulfils its obligations in respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Therefore, finding that the 1st Petitioner’s rights were infringed or in threat of 
infringement would have led to the State being forced to protect the human rights of the 1st 
Petitioner and all other intersex persons by creating a third category of sex. 
However, the Court chose to exercise judicial restraint in an issue involving a realm of human 
rights that the Court itself identified as being in need of reform. Instead of taking an active step 
to ensure that the rights of the 1st Petitioner were guaranteed, as is the Court’s mandate 
according to the Constitution, the Court ordered that the 1st Petitioner shall expediently make 
an application to the 3rd Respondent for the registration of Baby A and that a report in that 
regard shall be forwarded to the Court within 90 days of the judgment. Effectively, the only 
obligation that the Court placed on the 3rd respondent was to forward a report as to the 
registration of the 1st Petitioner. This means that the Court left the 1st Petitioner and all other 
intersex persons exposed to the continued threat of their human right to legal recognition being 
infringed by the Respondents. This conclusion can be arrived at due to the fact that no 
obligation has been placed on the Respondents to amend any of the laws relating to the 
registration of intersex persons which only serves to perpetuate the infringement of intersex 
persons’ rights. 
Pertaining to the issue of the State creating guidelines and rules for surgery on intersex persons, 
the Court stated that, ‘…time is now ripe for the development of rules and guidelines on 
corrective surgeries for intersex children especially minors such as Baby A.’10 The Court went 
on further to state that the mere fact that the term ‘sex’ under the legal framework at the time 
did not include intersex persons was no reason to lean on the traditional meaning that only 
accounted for male and female. As a result, the Court stated that it is the duty of the State to 
protect intersex persons by providing a legal framework to govern issues such as their 
registration under the Births and Deaths Registration Act, examinations and tests by doctors 
and corrective surgeries.  
Despite noting the need for the introduction of guidelines governing the surgeries carried out 
on intersex persons, the Court merely ordered that the 1st Respondent shall, within 90 days, file 
a report to the Court on the status of guidelines for corrective surgery for intersex persons. In 
arriving at its decision, the Court stated that it ‘would…strongly urge Parliament to consider 
enacting legislation…’11 Once more, the Court elected toexercise judicial restraint. The effect 
of such judicial restraint is that intersex children shall remain subject to ‘corrective surgery’ 
without their consent. This is because the Court did not order that the 1st Respondent move to 
ensure that such guidelines are created but that a report be issued as to the creation of said 
guidelines, which prima facie may seem to be the same thing and a victory for intersex persons. 
However, such an order only leaves the power to correct a situation that adversely affects 
intersex persons at the discretion of the party responsible for the creation of such adverse 
conditions.  
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11 Baby ‘A’ (Suing through the Mother E A) & another v Attorney General & 6 others [2014] eKLR para 67. 




To the present day, there exist no guidelines as to the conducting of surgeries on intersex 
children in Kenya. This means that intersex children are still exposed to corrective surgery 
which is only cosmetic and may lead to adverse medical consequences. These consequences 
may include an inability to function sexually or the lack of sexual sensation, or both.12 
Additionally, this means that intersex children are deprived of their bodily autonomy. 
It was open to the Court to decide that the lack of guidelines regarding surgeries on intersex 
persons amounted to a situation that threatened intersex persons’ right to dignity and freedom 
from inhuman and degrading treatment. Instead, the Court opted to neglect its duties to ensure 
that the purpose and principles of the Constitution are protected and left it up to the discretion 
of the 1st Respondent to create such guidelines. Articles 27(4) and 27(6) of the Constitution 
when read together would justify the Court making orders to compel the State to create 
guidelines accounting for intersex surgeries. When read together (for the purposes of this 
argument), the input of these two provisions is that there is an obligation on the State to treat 
every person equally, irrespective of their sex and that the State ought to take legislative and 
other measures to redress any disadvantages suffered by individuals or groups because of past 
discrimination.  
Therefore, the Court finding that the State ought to create guidelines for intersex surgeries 
would not have amounted to the Court overstepping its mandate but simply the Court upholding 
the provisions of the Constitution and ensuring that the State abided by these provisions. 
Turning to the issue of the creation of an organ or institute responsible for collecting data 
related to intersex children, the Court ordered that the 1st Respondent submit to the Court within 
90 days, information related to the organ or institution responsible for collecting and keeping 
data related to intersex children. The Court stated that it was vital for the State to collect data 
on intersex persons in Kenya as this would be crucial in making and designing policies to 
protect intersex persons as a marginalised group. Despite the fact that the Court was once again 
leaving it up to the discretion of the organ responsible for the lack of information regarding 
intersex persons to correct the decision, it must be noted that in 2019, a positive development 
was noted in this regard. For the first time in the history of Kenya, intersex persons were 
included in the National census conducted.  
Conclusion 
The Court in the case of Baby A acknowledged that there was a need to create laws and 
guidelines that were inclusive of and protected intersex persons. To this effect, the Court made 
several obiter remarks relating to the need to implement laws that were inclusive of intersex 
persons. These remarks may be of great persuasive value in the bid to realise the rights of 
intersex persons in Kenya. However, the Court did very little to ensure that such laws and 
guidelines are created as it ultimately made a decision that amounted to a request for ‘the 
powers that be’ to change the law to include intersex persons’ rights. The Court effectively 
neglected its duty and authority to ensure that such powers were in a position that would compel 
them to repeal laws that excluded intersex persons and create laws that were inclusive. 
Consequently, intersex persons still do not enjoy legal recognition of their sex and are still 
exposed to corrective surgery at birth which deprives them of their bodily integrity and 
autonomy. 
The Court in this case missed an opportunity to protect and realise the rights of intersex persons 
in Kenya, which not only would have benefited the Kenyan society, but would have served as 
                                                          
12 Sarah Creighton, Surgery for Intersex, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. 94(5) 2001. pp. 218–220. 




a beacon and point of reference for the development of intersex human rights within the African 
jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
